The signal to noise ratio in the differential cryptanalysis of 9 rounds of data encryption standard, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2006, nr 3 by Misztal, Michał
Regular paper The signal to noise ratio
in the differential cryptanalysis of 9 rounds
of data encryption standard
Michał Misztal
Abstract— There is presented the differential cryptanalysis
method of attack on data encryption standard (DES) reduced
to 9 rounds. More precise estimation than that of Biham and
Shamir of the signal to noise (S/N ) ratio is obtained. Also,
method of using the ratio in calculation of required number
of plaintexts is suggested. There are given results (time of per-
formance) and implementation’s issues of practical realisation
of this attack.
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1. Introduction
Diﬀerential cryptanalysis and its modiﬁcations (like for
instance impossible diﬀerentials) are the most powerful
method of attacks on the popular symmetric cryptosys-
tems – block ciphers. The idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis
was introduced in 1991 and applied to the former data en-
cryption standard (DES). At present every newly designed
block cipher must be at once evaluate due to resistance to
the diﬀerential attack. Hence diﬀerential attacks on con-
temporary block ciphers are possible only in theory or for
small number of rounds [1]. However diﬀerential crypt-
analysis could be still improved by applying in practice to
some well-known ciphers like mentioned DES.
This article is the continuation of paper [2], in which prac-
tical attack with diﬀerential cryptanalysis on DES cipher
reduced to 8 rounds was performed. In the introduction
of that paper it was stated that attack on more than 6 or
8 rounds of DES requires too much amount of data (en-
cryption of too many plaintexts) to be preformed in prac-
tice. Due to increasing of computational power of com-
puters (processor speed, capacity of operational and disc
memory) attacks which were considered as only theoret-
ical become now possible in practice. At the beginning
of 90’s, when idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis was born,
its inventors did not have possibility to verify their theo-
ries in practice. Simple attacks on 3 or 4 rounds of DES
were possible but for more rounds only theoretical estima-
tion of required amount of data and complexity time was
done. Practical attack on 8 rounds of DES [2] showed
that many of these theoretical estimations diﬀer from re-
ality (for example 25 000 pairs is far to small to suc-
ceed). At presence thanks to available processors and
especially to capacity of memory (cf. Section 5) we can
perform attack even on 9 rounds. Thanks to that we can
do some experiments and obtain practical, precise results
and than compare them to theory. It is the main aim of
this paper.
We start from the brief recollection of idea of diﬀerential
cryptanalysis and the scheme of DES cipher. More details
can be found in given references [2–4]. In Section 4 we
show how to calculate the S/N ratio of counting scheme
of attack on 9 round of DES in more precise way than up
to now. We also suggest a method of using the ratio in
calculation of required number of plaintexts. We theoreti-
cally calculate the eﬃcacy of ﬁltration of wrong pairs and
compare it to practice. In Section 5 the implementation’s
issues of practical realisation of this attack are given. At
the end we present results (running time and eﬃcacy) of
performed cryptanalysis.
2. The DES algorithm
The data encryption standard algorithm was the encryption
standard since year 1977. In year 2001 it was replaced
by chosen in contest block cipher Rijndael, which became
advanced encryption standard (AES).
The DES algorithm is a block cipher, which in standard
version encrypts 64-bit block of plaintext to 64-bit block
of ciphertext with 64-bit key. Due to standard actual length
of key is only 56-bits and 8 bits are extra bits used only
for parity check. Algorithm consists of 16 rounds and is
based on structure called Feistel’s network. In every round
left half of block is xored with result of f function ap-
plied to right half of block. Then in every round but
last both halves are swapped. Hence f function is main
element of every round. It transforms half of encrypted
block (32-bits) with 48-bit subkey of round. Every sub-
key is obtained from main key by algorithm called key
schedule.
The f function uses two permutations E and P and also
8 nonlinear mappings called substitution tables or substi-
tution boxes (brieﬂy s-boxes). Extending permutation E
transforms 32-bit block to 48-bit block. Permutation P
transforms 32-bit block to 32-bit block. In every s-box
6-bit input is transformed to 4-bit output. General scheme
of algorithm and scheme of f function are presented in
Figs. 1 and 2. Key schedule, permutations E and P and all
eight s-boxes can be found in given references.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of DES algorithm.
Fig. 2. Scheme of f function.
The DES algorithm reduced to n rounds is an algorithm in
which two changes were made:
– number of rounds was reduced from 16 to n, but in
the nth (last) round there is no swapping of halves,
like after 16th round in standard version;
– permutations IP and IP−1 were removed due to their
insigniﬁcancy to cryptanalysis.
3. Diﬀerential cryptanalysis
The diﬀerential cryptanalysis was introduced in year 1991
by Biham and Shamir [3] as modern method of cryptanal-
ysis of DES. At least in theory this method is better than
exhaustive search, it means testing all possible 256 keys.
It is based on dependency between pairs of plaintexts with
certain diﬀerence (in term of XOR) and diﬀerences of
their ciphertexts. From above the name “diﬀerential” was
derived. It is a chosen plaintext (CPA) type of crypt-
analysis.
Basic idea of diﬀerential cryptanalysis is observation of
behaviour of pair of blocks with certain diﬀerence trans-
formed through rounds of cipher rather than single block.
For linear mappings like permutations, XOR operations
the diﬀerence of pair of blocks behaves in deterministic
way, like single block. The most important thing is that
XOR with unknown key does not change this diﬀerence.
If two arbitrary blocks X and X∗ with known diﬀerence
X ′ = X⊕X∗ are XORed with unknown key K then the new
values of this blocks X ⊕K and X∗⊕K are unknown but
their diﬀerence X ′ remains the same. It happens because
of property of XOR operation in which K ⊕K = 0. The
only problem during analysis of propagation of diﬀerences
is the application of nonlinear mappings, i.e., s-boxes. For
s-boxes we can ﬁnd input and output diﬀerence, which oc-
curs more frequently than others, i.e., with higher probabil-
ity. However it makes that diﬀerential cryptanalysis is only
probabilistic method. Its results depend on certain value
of key, chosen plaintext and it requires suﬃciently many
tries to ﬁnd correct key. To ﬁnd the best input – output
diﬀerence propagations of s-boxes the so-called XOR pro-
ﬁles are constructed. The XOR proﬁle of s-box is a table,
which shows how many certain input diﬀerence goes to
certain output diﬀerence. XOR proﬁles are discussed also
in the next section.
If we know or we can predict behaviour of diﬀerences in
individual operations and rounds, then we can ﬁnd input
diﬀerence, i.e., diﬀerence of two plaintexts which after
ﬁrst round goes to certain diﬀerence with some probabil-
ity, which subsequently after second round goes to another
diﬀerence with some probability and so on. This sequence
of successive diﬀerences between successive rounds from
plaintext diﬀerence to ciphertext diﬀerence is called dif-
ferential characteristic. Every characteristic has its prob-
ability, which is calculated as product of probabilities
of diﬀerence propagations for all rounds. Main problem
in diﬀerential cryptanalysis is to ﬁnd “good” diﬀerential
characteristic, which means characteristic with high prob-
ability.
Only diﬀerential characteristic with suﬃciently high proba-
bility makes possible to perform a diﬀerential attack. If we
have such characteristic we choose pairs of plaintexts with
diﬀerence given by this characteristic and we obtain their
ciphertexts. Then we try to discard pairs, which do not fol-
low our characteristic. This process we call ﬁltration. We
know only plaintext and ciphertext diﬀerence and we do not
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know diﬀerence between individual rounds, because cipher
is a black box for us. Hence we cannot be sure which pairs
are good, i.e., follow our characteristic and which pairs are
wrong and only look like they follow this characteristic. In
the ﬁltration process we can analyse ciphertext diﬀerence
and discard pairs, which are wrong for sure. All good pairs
will survive this ﬁltration but some number of wrong pairs
will survive as well.
After ﬁltration for every non-discarded pair we may ﬁnd
possible subkeys for example last or ﬁrst round or parts of
these subkeys (for example 30 out of 48 bits) in procedure
called key recovery. Detailed scheme of this procedure can
be found in [3] or [2]. Every pair suggests several sub-
keys. Good pair suggests exactly one good subkey and few
wrong subkeys. Wrong pair suggests only wrong subkeys.
Hence we have to count for every non-discarded pair how
many times every subkey occurred. For suﬃcient number
of analysed pairs the correct subkey should be the most fre-
quently appeared subkey. The indicator of how many times
the correct subkey is more frequent than other subkeys is
signal to noise (S/N) ratio. Precise calculation of this pa-
rameter can inform us about chances of success of certain
attack. Due to this parameter we can also determine the
number of pairs required to assure success of the attack. In
the next section we discuss how to calculate the S/N ratio
in attack on 9 rounds DES and how to determine the re-
quired number of pairs from the S/N ratio. Given method
is general and could be used in other attacks and for other
ciphers.
4. The signal to noise ratio in attack
on 9 rounds of DES
4.1. Differential characteristic and its probability
To attack algorithm DES reduced to 9 rounds we use the
following 6-round diﬀerential characteristic – see Fig. 3.
The characteristic is taken from [3] and it is the best diﬀer-
ential characteristic of DES found up to now. Its probability
is a product of probabilities of 6 successive rounds and it
is equal to:
p =
(12·14·16)·1 ·(10·16)·1 · (10·16)·1
643 ·4 ·642 ·642 ·4 =
217 ·525
246
=
525
229
≈ 9.7788870334625244140625 ·10−7
≈
1
1000000 .
With this characteristic we can attack 9 rounds of data
encryption standard by adding three more rounds (so-cal-
led 3R attack). Due to the characteristic for good pairs
we have:
R′6 = 40 5C 00 00x ,
hence for ﬁve s-boxes: S2, S5, S6, S7, S8:
S′E7 = S′I7 = 0 and S′O7 = 0,
where:
S′E7 means 6-bit diﬀerence after permutation E in
7th round,
S′I7 means 6-bit diﬀerence before s-boxes layer in
7th round,
S′O7 means 4-bit diﬀerence after s-boxes layer in
7th round.
Due to scheme of DES for these s-boxes we have the fol-
lowing relation:
f (R8, K9)′ = C′L⊕R′5⊕ f (R6, K7) .
The characteristic allows us to obtain for these 5 s-boxes
input and output in 9th round required for key recov-
ery procedure. By applying the characteristic and the key
recovery procedure for one round (9th in that case) we
obtain 5 (s-boxes) · 6 bits = 30 bits of subkey K9, and
30 bits of main key as well. Remaining 26 bits of main
key can be found by exhaustive search.
Fig. 3. Six-round characteristic.
Due to the probability of the characteristic only some frac-
tion of pairs will follow it. We know only the diﬀerence of
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plaintexts and corresponding diﬀerence of ciphertexts af-
ter 9 rounds so we cannot conﬁrm whether it is a good or
bad pair. But we can do some analysis for s-boxes S2, S5,
S6, S7 and S8. If for any s-box obtained input diﬀerence
does not go to obtained output diﬀerence, or equivalently
set of suggested subkeys is empty, than we know for sure
that analysed pair does not follow the characteristic and
should be discarded. Some number of wrong pairs can-
not be revealed and discarded in that way. Unﬁltered pairs
will suggest only wrong subkeys and they will provide only
disinformation noise. Also good pairs will suggest a few
wrong subkeys and exactly one correct subkey. To distin-
guish the correct subkey from the noise we count occur-
rences of all suggested subkeys. The correct subkey should
occurs more times than others wrong subkeys. The ques-
tion is how many pairs we need to analyse to distinguish the
correct subkey from the noise. To determine the number of
required pairs the S/N ratio is introduced. The parameter
estimates the ratio of the number of good pairs equals the
number of occurrences of the correct subkey (signal) to the
number of occurrence of all subkeys (noise).
4.2. The signal to noise ratio parameter
The S/N ratio of counting scheme is deﬁned as ratio of
the number of good pairs and average number of counts
of wrong subkeys in counting scheme. In other words the
parameter shows how many more times will the correct
subkey occur than any other subkey. The formula for
the S/N ratio is given below:
S/N = mp
mα
β
2k
=
2k p
αβ ,
where:
p – the probability of the characteristic,
k – the number of bits of counted subkeys,
α – the average number of subkeys suggested by one
analysed pair,
β – the ratio of analysed pairs to all pairs, an eﬃciency
of ﬁltration,
m – the number of decrypted pairs.
From the formula it is easy to see that:
– the S/N ratio is independent of the number of pairs
used in the attack,
– diﬀerent schemes of counting based on the same
characteristic but counting diﬀerent number of bits
of subkey have diﬀerent value of the S/N ratio.
The number of good pairs required to ﬁnd the correct sub-
key is a function of the S/N ratio parameter. For one s-box
of DES we assume k = 6, α = 4 (average number of 6-bits
subkeys suggested by one pair), β = 0.8 (average percent-
age of possible diﬀerence transitions in s-box).
With these values we can calculate the S/N ratio for the at-
tack on 9 rounds in the following way. We use key recovery
procedure for 5 s-boxes in the last round simultaneously;
hence we assume following values:
– k = 5 ·6 = 30 bits,
– αβ = 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 = 45 = 210 = 1024, the average
number of 30-bit subkeys suggested by one anal-
ysed pair; for every s-box we have in average four
6-bit subkeys, hence to obtain 30-bit subkey for ﬁve
s-boxes we have to determine all combinations of
these 6-bit subkeys.
The parameters α and β could be determined separately as
we will do later in the precise estimation of the S/N ratio,
and now we only determine their product like above. It is
easier now and as we will show it is also precise.
We know the probability of the characteristic and above
values of parameters so we can calculate the S/N ratio
now:
S/N =
230 ·
1
1000000
45
=
220
1000000
=
1048576
1000000 = 1.048576 ≈ 1 .
It was assumed in [3], that if the S/N is between 1 and 2,
then about 20–40 good pairs are suﬃcient. If the S/N is
high then only a few occurrences of right pairs are needed
to uniquely identify a right value of the subkey bits. If
the S/N is small the number of required pairs is big and
when S/N is less than 1 we never ﬁnd the correct subkey.
In that case the correct subkey occurs more rare than other
subkeys in average. Hence the maximum value in counter
is not the value of the correct subkey even for huge number
of pairs. In that case attack would be impossible.
In our attack the S/N is small but higher than 1, what
makes the attack possible at least in theory. We have to
determine the number of pairs needed to success of the at-
tack. According to [3] 30 good pairs are suﬃcient. Good
pair appears statistically one time per every 1 000 000 gen-
erated pairs, hence about 30 million pairs will be needed
to perform the attack and to uniquely identify a right value
of 30-bit subkey. Experiments have shown (cf. Section 6)
that above number of pairs is too small in general. Some-
times that number is suﬃcient but it happens too rarely.
We would like to determine the number of needed pairs,
which is suﬃcient to uniquely identify a right subkey in all
cases. 30 million, it is too small for sure. How many pairs
we need and how to determine this number in the clear and
faultless way? We will try to answer the question and we
will start from precise calculation of the S/N ratio.
4.3. Precise calculation of the signal to noise ratio
To determine the number of pairs needed to success of the
attack ﬁrst we have to calculate the S/N ratio in the most
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precise way. If this parameter is much higher than 1 a few
(3–4) pairs would be suﬃcient like in the attack on 4 or
6 rounds DES. But in the case of attack on 9 rounds DES
the ratio is only slightly higher than 1, so we have to cal-
culate it very precise. We will of course use the formula
given previously:
S/N = 2
k p
αβ .
Value of k remains unchanged: k = 30 but the probabil-
ity p is now exact value, i.e., p = 525229 . We have also as-
sumed diﬀerent values of α and β ., We start from β pa-
rameter, which expresses the proportion of the number of
analysed pairs to the number of all generated pairs, so it
is an eﬃciency of ﬁltration. Whole ﬁltration we can do
in the 3R attack is testing for all ﬁve s-boxes and check
whether input diﬀerence obtained from ciphertexts and the
characteristic may cause obtained output diﬀerence. If for
these input and output diﬀerences in appropriate XOR pro-
ﬁle it is zero entry then it means this input-output transi-
tion is impossible. If it happens even for one s-box out
of ﬁve we know for sure that this pair is wrong and we
discard it. Hence parameter β is a probability that for all
ﬁve s-boxes simultaneously the input-output diﬀerences are
possible. In average percentage of non-zero values in XOR
proﬁles of all s-boxes of DES is 0.8. For ﬁve s-boxes we
may assume β = 0.85 ≈ 0.32768, but it is not suﬃciently
precise for us. We have to look closer at XOR proﬁles of
s-boxes. In [3] percentages of non-zero values are given
for all 8 s-boxes. We have determined these percentages
with bigger precision. All results are given in Table 1.
Table 1
Percentage of non-zero values in XOR proﬁles of s-boxes
s-box Percentage [3] Precise values
S1 79.4 0.794921875
S2∗ 78.6 0.786132813
S3 79.6 0.796875000
S4 68.5 0.685546875
S5∗ 76.5 0.765625000
S6∗ 80.4 0.804687500
S7∗ 77.2 0.772460938
S8∗ 77.1 0.771484375
In our attack we deal only with 5 s-boxes (denoted ∗) so
parameter β is a product of corresponding values from the
table and it equals:
β = 0.288631 < 0.85.
Than we calculate value of α . Parameter α means the num-
ber of subkeys suggested by one analysed pair. It is the
average number of diﬀerent subkeys found by key recov-
ery algorithm for one non-discarded pair. To obtain α we
will again use XOR proﬁles. For individual s-box the aver-
age number of found subkeys is equal to average entry in
the XOR proﬁle of the s-box. It is equal 64 (the sum of
entries in every row) divided by 16 (the number of columns)
hence it is 4. But after ﬁltration we do not take impossible
transitions in to account. So we should calculate the aver-
age only from non-zero entries. The values of α calculated
in that way are given in Table 2. As we can see they are
diﬀerent for diﬀerent s-boxes.
Table 2
The average of non-zero entries in XOR proﬁle of s-boxes
s-box Average of non-zero values
S1 5.031941032
S2∗ 5.088198758
S3 5.019607843
S4 5.834757835
S5∗ 5.224489796
S6∗ 4.970873786
S7∗ 5.178255373
S8∗ 5.184810127
Similarly like for β , α is a product of values for ﬁve s-boxes
denoted by ∗ and it equals:
α = 3547.782689 .
Product of α and β is equal to αβ = 1024 = 45, so previous
estimation was also very precise. But the second method
is more universal; because it calculates values of α and β
separately, however it is also needs more work.
Now we know the values of all parameters so we can cal-
culate S/N again:
S/N =
230 ·
525
229
0.288631 ·3547.782689
=
1050
1024 = 1.025390625 .
This value is diﬀerent from previous on the third signiﬁ-
cant position although we actually have changed only the
probability p.
Very interesting thing is that experiments (cf. Section 6)
provide diﬀerent value of β parameter. We have anal-
ysed diﬀerent number of pairs and obtain the number of
pairs non-discarded in ﬁltration process. Proportion of these
numbers determines β .
From Table 3 we can see that value of the parameter is
rather constant. Small diﬀerences are consequences of
probabilistic behaviour of diﬀerential cryptanalysis. It is
also slightly diﬀerent from theoretically obtained value. It
may be explained as follows. We generate pairs of plain-
texts not actually in random. First plaintext from the pair
is generated randomly but second one depends on the char-
acteristic. Than pairs of ciphertexts are not random and
diﬀerential cryptanalysis can work at all. Theoretical es-
timation of β was obtained for fully random values. And
here this diﬀerence appears. About 1/p pairs are good and
survive ﬁltration for sure, some portion of pairs may follow
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the characteristic for a few rounds and have more chances
to survive ﬁltration then fully random ciphertexts. Hence
in practice more pairs remain after ﬁltration and parame-
ter β is bigger then theoretical estimation made for fully
random pairs.
Table 3
Parameter β obtained in experiments
No. β
1 0.2916292
2 0.2915709
3 0.2915562
4 0.2914597
5 0.2920615
6 0.2915714
Parameter α obtained in those experiments was accurate
with its theoretical value.
We put value of β provided by experiments to the formula
of the S/N and we have:
S/N =
230 ·
525
229
0.2915 ·3547.782689 = 1.015298465 .
Value of the S/N obtained in this way we will use in further
considerations.
4.4. The method of determination the number of pairs
needed to the attack based on the signal to noise
ratio
We have determined as precise as possible the S/N ra-
tio. Now we will use the ratio to estimate the number
of required pairs. If the S/N is much bigger then 1 we
can assume that even 3–4 good pairs are suﬃcient to suc-
cessful attack. But when the S/N is close to 1 like in
that case the number of required good pairs is much big-
ger. In-advance assumption that 20, 30 or 40 good pairs
are suﬃcient must be veriﬁed in certain attack. The at-
tack on 9 rounds of DES need more then suggested in [3]
30 or 40 good pairs to uniquely identify the correct key.
Sometimes these numbers are suﬃcient but it happens too
rarely. Rough estimation of eﬃciency of attack with these
numbers of pairs is smaller then 50%. So how many pairs
are needed to signiﬁcantly increase this eﬃciency?
We want to set the number of required pairs to be as small
as possible but to be suﬃcient to uniquely identify the cor-
rect key. To recall, found key is a value, which has occurred
the most frequently. It means that we search the counter of
occurrences of all keys for the maximum value. If a noise
is high the maximum value may not correspond to the cor-
rect key but some other key. The number of occurrences
of the correct key may be second or third or next value in
the counter. In that case attack ends with failure. In our
attack the S/N ratio is greater than 1 (and it is possible at
all) so increasing number of generated and analysed pairs
tends to increased number of occurrences of correct key.
That number increases faster than average number of oc-
currences of incorrect key (noise). So the number of pairs
to analyse should be suﬃciently big to assure that number
of occurrences of the correct key will be maximum value
in the counter. It means that number will be greater than
number of occurrences of all other keys with big probabil-
ity. Due to the probabilistic nature of our problem values in
the counter are diﬀerent in diﬀerent experiments. And we
can use only average numbers, which are easy to determine.
We cannot predict the maximum value of noise or signal in
the counter but we know in average how many good pairs
were analysed. Also we know that every good pair gives
one good key. We know the average value in the counter
(level of a noise) as well. Now we want to be sure that
number of occurrences of correct key would “stand out of
noise”. It means it would be greater even by 1 than other
values in the counter. Hence we have to set the number
of required pairs in order to the expected number of good
pairs and occurrences of good key as well be greater than
the expected average number in the counter. The expected
number of good pairs can be calculated as a product of
the number of all analysed pairs and the probability of the
characteristic: m · p. It is the numerator of the S/N ratio.
The expected average number in the counter can be calcu-
lated as: (m ·α ·β )/2k (the denominator of the S/N). Now
we ﬁnd such m that the numerator (m · p) is greater at least
by 1 than the denominator. We start with m = 30 000 000
because we know that value is too small. We assume step
5 million and check successive values of m. Results of our
searching are given in Table 4.
The ﬁrst row gives the number of pairs used in the at-
tack. The second counts the average number in the counter,
third – number of good pairs. The fourth row is a propor-
tion of above rows (row 2/row 3), so it is the S/N ratio
actually. The last row expresses the diﬀerence: row 3 –
row 2. As we can see the diﬀerence is greater than 1 for
m = 70 million and we end our search with that value. We
believe that in some sense the last row expresses the success
of attack with corresponding number of pairs.
Precise value of m can be also calculated by using the
S/N ratio. The number of occurrence of good key grows
faster than the average number in the counter by factor
equals to the S/N ratio. We want the signal be greater by
one than noise. We put the nominator to be by 1 greater
than the denominator, hence:
mp−
mp
S/N
> 1 ⇒
(S/N−1)mp
S/N
> 1 ⇒ m >
S/N
S/N−1
1
p
.
In that way we obtain the estimation on the number of
required pairs to successful attack:
m >
S/N
(S/N−1)p
.
As we can see, with the growth of the S/N ratio the num-
ber m tends to 1/p.
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Table 4
Results of searching for required number of pairs
1. Number of pairs m 30000000 35000000 40000000 45000000 50000000
2. Average in counter 28.89462 33.71038743 38.52616 43.34192669 48.15769633
3. Number good pairs 29.33666 34.22610462 39.11555 44.00499165 48.89443517
4. The S/N ratio 1.015298 1.015298465 1.015298 1.015298465 1.015298465
5. Diﬀerence 0.44204 0.51571719 0.58939 0.66306496 0.73673884
1. Number of pairs m 55000000 60000000 65000000 67866654 70000000
2. Average in counter 52.97346596 57.7892356 62.60500522 65.3660333 67.42077
3. Number good pairs 53.78387868 58.6733222 63.56276572 66.3660333 68.45221
4. The S/N ratio 1.015298465 1.015298465 1.015298465 1.015298465 1.015298
5. Diﬀerence 0.81041273 0.884087 0.95776049 1 1.03143
The estimation can be useful in every attack, especially
when the S/N ratio is close but greater than 1. Eﬃcacy
of attack with that number of pairs is very high (cf. Sec-
tion 6) but still less than 100%. Due to the probabilistic
nature of the problem an experiment in which that number
is too small always may happen. But now it will happen
rarely. In that case we of course can use more pairs.
In our attack we have:
m =
1.015298465 ·229
(1.015298465−1) ·525 = 67866653.95 .
Hence we need above 67 million pairs. It conﬁrms the
results given in the Table 4.
Using the above estimation we can make quite interest-
ing observation. Namely, if we use the estimation with
very ﬁrst calculated value of S/N ratio [3] we will obtain
m > 22074391.17. It means that for this value of the
S/N ratio 30 million pairs would be suﬃcient.
5. Implementation issues
Implementation and performance of considered attack is
possible now thanks to progress in computational power
of computers (processor speed, capacity of operational and
disc memory). But still there are some problems and re-
strictions we have to solve. Main problem is a size of
memory to store the counter.
We count the number of occurrences of all 30-bit subkeys,
so we need the counter, which consists 230 at least 8-bit
values. It requires operational memory of size 1 GB. In
the attack on 8 rounds of DES the problem was solved by
dividing it on two less complicated subproblems [2]. In
the case of 9 rounds this solution is impossible. Computer
with 1 GB of operational memory is still unavailable due
to high costs. The problem was solved on computer with
operational memory of size 256 MB by time-memory trade
oﬀ 256 MB of memory allows on using a counter with
228 elements. The space of 230 was divided on four separate
subspaces of size 228 depending on two most signiﬁcant bits
of 30-bit key. Whole process of counting keys is divided
on four substages.
In ﬁrst substage we generate required number of pairs.
Than we perform key recovery algorithm and save in tem-
porary ﬁle only non-discarded pairs (ciphertexts actually).
It requires 2 · β · m · 8 bytes of disc memory and for
m = 70 million it makes about 324 MB and now it is easily
available. In that smaller counter we put only keys with
the same two signiﬁcant bits equal for example 00. In the
counter we search for the maximum. If the distinct maxi-
mum exists we assume it corresponds with the correct key
and we end this stage. The distinct maximum means that
it is only one maximum value and the value is signiﬁcantly
greater than any others. In the other case we proceed to
next substage. We put into the new counter only keys with
the same two signiﬁcant bits equal now for example 01.
In the second substage we use saved in the ﬁrst substage
non-discarded pairs. We do not perform the ﬁltration
again what signiﬁcantly reducing the time of the substage.
Than we again search for the distinct maximum in the new
counter taking into account maximum value from the ﬁrst
counter. If the distinct maximum exists we ﬁnish with that
value of key. In the other case we proceed to third and
forth if it is needed. The time of that stage may diﬀer
signiﬁcantly with respect to the number of substages per-
formed until the key was found. In average we perform
two substages. That approach makes the issues of required
number of pairs very complicated. If the number appeared
too small increasing it is very troublesome and we must
repeat whole attack actually. As we can see it is very im-
portant to set the appropriate number of required pairs at
the beginning. From the other hand, the number should be
as small as possible to decrease the time of attack.
The second and very unexpected problem, which showed
out, was generating the pairs of plaintexts. As we stated
we need 70 million pairs, so we have to generate above
226 · 23 = 229 bytes in random. The period of standard
pseudorandom number generator in used programming lan-
guage (C++) should be 231, but for the least signiﬁcant
byte it is smaller and it is only 227 (it is a discovered error
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Table 5
First results
Number of generated
pairs [million]
Number of non-discarded
pairs
β Max in counter Number of occurrences
of correct key
Result
30 8743769 0.2914580 64 (4 times) 63 Failure
35 10202090 0.2914883 77 77 Success
35 10203548 0.2915299 73 59 Failure
35 10205025 0.2915721 81 81 Success
35 10204767 0.2915648 71 61 Failure
35 10203362 0.2915246 70 (3 times) 70 Failure
35 10200564 0.2914447 76 76 Success
35 10204390 0.2915537 73 (2 times) 64 Failure
35 10207181 0.2916337 72 (2 times) 59 Failure
35 10205876 0.2915965 75 48 Failure
35 10201090 0.2914597 73 60 Failure
40 11655712 0.2913928 88 88 Success
40 11658656 0.2914664 92 92 Success
40 11662246 0.2915562 87 87 Success
40 11661319 0.2915330 82 76 Failure
40 11665598 0.2916400 79 (2 times) 64 Failure
40 11662246 0.2915562 84 84 Success
50 14576501 0.2914666 99 99 Success
50 14573329 0.2916178 105 105 Success
50 14580889 0.2916178 98 80 Failure
50 14575285 0.2915057 95 88 Failure
50 14586415 0.2917283 109 109 Success
50 14576447 0.2915289 101 101 Success
50 14579432 0.2915886 94 85 Failure
50 14579003 0.2915801 100 100 Success
50 14575915 0.2915183 95 94 Failure
of compiler!). So we have to use our own pseudorandom
number generator with the suitable period, which generates
numbers with uniform distribution. We did not need any
cryptographically strong generator but only fast one so we
used ordinary linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with
length 64 bits, what made its period equals to 264−1 bits.
That problem is irrelevant from cryptanalytic point of view
but we would like to point out that in the case of such huge
amounts of data similar problems may completely warp the
results of the cryptanalysis.
6. Results
Now we present the results of performance of considered
attack. The attack was implemented in C++ language
in Borland C++ Builder 5 on a computer with processor
Celeron II 1.3 GHz and 320 MB of operational memory.
We used implementation of 9 rounds of DES running with
speed 3.2 million blocks per second what makes through-
output 200 Mbit/s.
We start with attacks with too small number of pairs. Ta-
ble 5 shows the results of attacks with 30–50 million pairs.
The ﬁrst column presents the number of generated pairs.
The second expresses the number of pairs, which survive
the ﬁltration. The third is a proportion of two previous
columns and it is an eﬃcacy of ﬁltration (parameter β ).
In the next column the maximum value in the counter is
given. The number in the parenthesis means how many
times the maximum appeared if more than one. The ﬁfth
column gives the number of occurrences of the correct key.
In the last column the result of the attack (success or fail-
ure) is given. The result can be derived from two previous
columns.
From the table we can roughly estimate the probability
of success of the attack. The probability of success of
attack with 30 or 35 million pairs is smaller than 1/3,
with 40 or 50 million pairs slightly exceeds 1/2.
Table 6 presents in similar way the results of attacks with
70 million pairs. Additionally the time of performance of
substages is given.
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Table 6
Main results
Number Number Time of substages Time of Time of Number
of all pairs of non-discarded β [s] II stage attack Max of occurrences Result
[million] pairs 1 2 3 4 [s] [s] of correct key
70 20411466 0.2915924 7391 4987 4977 – 138 17493 139 139 Success
70 20407887 0.2915412 7395 4979 4983 – 6 17363 144 144 Success
70 20400900 0.2914414 7374 – – – 245 7619 127 127 Success
70 20410516 0.2915788 7384 – – – 84 7468 134 134 Success
70 20408476 0.2915497 7363 – – – 29 7392 128 128 Success
70 20408331 0.2915476 7382 – – – 85 7467 145 145 Success
70 20402070 0.2914581 7358 4982 4948 6085 313 23686 121 116 Failure
70 20414410 0.2916344 7376 – – – 273 7649 149 149 Success
70 20411673 0.2915953 7384 4945 4955 4951 136 22371 143 143 Success
70 20404332 0.2914905 7360 4935 – – 72 12367 133 133 Success
70 20405427 0.2915061 7353 4938 – – 211 12502 132 132 Success
70 20414960 0.2916423 7389 4944 – – 155 12488 123 123 Success
70 20404748 0.2914964 7391 – – – 85 7476 133 133 Success
70 20409296 0.2915614 7353 4932 4927 – 89 17301 135 135 Success
70 20415691 0.2916527 7365 4916 – – 196 12477 148 148 Success
70 20408939 0.2915563 7455 – – – 17 7472 126 126 Success
70 20403624 0.2914803 6792 – – – 210 7002 151 151 Success
70 20409608 0.2915658 6804 4729 4707 4710 152 21102 119 118 Failure
70 20404448 0.2914921 6766 – – – 232 6998 121 – Failure
70 20412821 0.2916117 6768 – – – 182 6950 144 144 Success
70 20413305 0.2916186 6764 – – – 77 6841 152 152 Success
70 20404312 0.2914902 6772 – – – 13 6785 149 149 Success
70 20413398 0.2916200 6769 4709 4696 – 28 16202 146 146 Success
Average 0.2915574 7167 4892 4847 5249 132 11500 Succ./fail. 20/3
Lack of given time of any substage means that substage was
not necessary because the maximum was found in previ-
ous substage. The ﬁrst substage is always about 1.5 times
longer than others. It results from applied procedure of
counting keys. In the ﬁrst stage we generate all pairs, than
we perform the ﬁltration and save them. In next substages
we only analyse non-discarded pairs what is signiﬁcantly
faster.
As we can see only 3 out of 23 attacks have ended with fail-
ure. In the two ﬁrst cases all four substages were performed,
but in any of them distinct maximum was not found, and
the correct key occurred more rare than others. In the third
case distinct maximum was found but it did not correspond
to the correct key. The eﬃciency of the attack with 70 mil-
lion pairs we can consider as very high and close to 90%
even for a few dozen experiments.
After assuming that 70 million is the proper number of re-
quired pairs we can perform a full attack. It means after
ﬁnding the 30 bits of main key in the ﬁrst stage we can
ﬁnd remaining 26 bits by exhaustive search of space 226.
It was now a simple and fast task. The column “Time of
II stage” in Table 6 gives time (in seconds) of exhaustive
search that was needed to ﬁnd remaining 26 bits of main
key. As we can see that search takes not longer than 5 min-
utes. The column “Time of attack” gives a total time of the
attack calculated as the sum of ﬁves values in the previous
columns.
In the cases of ﬁrst two failures the correct key occurred too
less times to be found. So all four substages were performed
and entire search in the II stage (313 and 152 seconds), but
without success. Of course if ﬁrst 30 bits are wrong we
can never adjust the last 26 bits to get the correct key.
The last failure was of diﬀerent type. In the initial sub-
stages (in the ﬁrst in the certain case) a distinct maximum
was found, but it did not correspond to the correct key.
Algorithm ended without performing the next substages in
which the correct key should be found. That way we did not
found the number of occurrences of the correct key. That
failure is not based on too less number of analysed pairs,
but it comes from extorted dividing the ﬁrst stage on four
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Table 7
Final results
Number Number Time of substages Time of Time of Number
of all pairs of non-discarded β [s] II stage attack Max of occurrences Result
[million] pairs 1 2 3 4 [s] [s] of correct key
70 20407072 0.2915296 6799 4772 4782 4793 151 21297 124 124 Failure
70 20411849 0.2915978 6847 – – – 31 6878 130 130 Success
70 20412699 0.2916100 6837 – – – 138 6975 133 133 Success
70 20414234 0.2916319 6842 4934 4926 4940 73 21715 145 145 Success
70 20407731 0.2915390 6838 4907 4932 4928 179 21784 131 141 Success
70 20402279 0.2914611 6834 4919 4933 4917 152 21755 124 117 Failure
70 20409520 0.2915646 6841 – – – 233 7074 125 – Failure
70 20407149 0.2915317 6829 – – – 69 6898 156 156 Success
70 20409663 0.2915666 6835 – – – 152 6987 156 156 Success
70 20413565 0.2916224 7030 4776 4896 4812 151 21665 121 115 Failure
70 20412273 0.2916049 6827 4797 4805 – 142 16571 128 128 Success
70 20412370 0.2916053 6867 5002 5014 5015 212 22110 122 122 Failure
70 20405958 0.2915137 8277 5406 5118 4886 41 23728 130 130 Success
70 20412912 0.2916130 4704 – – – 225 4929 139 139 Success
70 20416821 0.2916689 6740 4699 4695 – 163 16297 144 144 Success
70 20406430 0.2915204 6818 4832 4855 4942 152 21599 123 120 Failure
70 20401766 0.2914548 6827 4809 – – 226 11862 149 149 Success
70 20409267 0.2915610 6855 – – – 71 6926 136 136 Success
70 20409910 0.2915701 6832 4808 4837 4819 69 21365 148 148 Success
70 20411009 0.2915858 6830 – – – 205 7035 149 149 Success
70 20406152 0.2915165 6880 – – – 109 6989 138 138 Success
70 20407093 0.2915299 7576 5120 5120 4882 68 22766 144 144 Success
70 20399601 0.2914229 6712 4806 4804 4817 146 21285 130 130 Success
70 20410754 0.2915822 6838 – – – 255 7093 136 136 Success
70 20406290 0.2915184 7796 4959 5184 – 90 18029 133 133 Success
70 20407788 0.29153983 7571 5119 5119 4895 197 22901 152 152 Success
70 20416450 0.29166357 6722 – – – 222 6944 142 142 Success
70 20413332 0.29161903 6840 4937 4929 4943 150 21799 146 146 Success
70 20408688 0.29155269 8576 5337 5115 – 208 19236 141 141 Success
70 20408957 0.29155653 6835 4925 4931 – 244 16935 136 136 Success
70 20408126 0.29154466 6831 4925 4933 4922 220 21831 135 135 Success
70 20407964 0.29154234 6836 4930 4946 4948 46 21706 154 154 Success
70 20408866 0.29155523 6835 4941 – – 31 11807 128 128 Success
Average 0.29156041 6938 4939 4944 4897 146 15599 Succ./fail. 27/6
substages. In that case we should despite to ﬁnd suspect
key in the initial substages continue with next substages.
So the open problem appears: should we always perform
all four substages what will increasing time of the attack
signiﬁcantly or like it was done stop after ﬁnding the ﬁrst
distinct maximum what is faster but generate above fail-
ures?
The way of omitting that problem is ﬁxing a threshold
on the maximum value in the counter. If the found max-
imum is lower than the threshold we will continue with
the next substages. As the performed experiments show
“the level of noise” which is the maximum number of oc-
currences of incorrect key does not exceed 125. However
the correct key usually occurs (if we reached adequate sub-
stage) more often, and even more than 130 times. Hence
we can assume that if we ﬁnd the distinct maximum but
lower than 125 that value does not correspond to the cor-
rect key and we will continue with next substages. The
results of attacks performed with that rule are presented
in Table 7.
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Introducing the threshold almost eliminated the failures,
which comes from dividing problem on substages. Fail-
ures, which appeared now, derive from too small number
of occurrences of the correct key. In those cases we should
generate more pairs to analyse. The exception is the ﬁrst
failure and the failure where the number of occurrences of
the correct key is not given. In the ﬁrst case the maximum
value in the counter corresponded to the correct key but it
did not exceeded the ﬁxed threshold and was not taken in to
account. In that case even without applying the “threshold”
rule attack would end with failure, because found maximum
was not distinct, the second biggest value was only smaller
by 1. In the second case the distinct maximum was found
and it exceeded the threshold but it was not the correct key.
In that case the threshold should be higher. But the higher
threshold may cause more failures of the ﬁrst (previous)
type. Fixing the threshold is very hard and important case.
Increasing the threshold will reduce the number of failures
of second type but will increase the number of failures of
the ﬁrst type and vice versa. However the small number
of total failures in our experiments let us consider that we
ﬁxed the threshold correctly.
The eﬃciency of the attack we can roughly approximate
on 80%, 6 failures in 33 tries, and the average time of
performance of entire attack was 15 600 seconds, which is
about 4 hours and 20 minutes. It is very short time for
recovering full 56-bit key of 9-round algorithm.
Acknowledgement
This work has been partly supported by Polish Committee
of Science Research project number 0 T00A 020 25 and
partly supported by the European Commission under con-
tract IST 2002-507932 (ECRYPT).
References
[1] E. Biham, V. Furman, M. Misztal, and V. Rijmen, “Diﬀerential crypt-
analysis of Q”, in Fast Software Encryption: 8th International Work-
shop, FSE 2001, Yokohama, Japan, April 2–4, 2001, M. Matsui, Ed.,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin [etc.]: Springer-Verlag,
2002, vol. 2355, pp. 174–186.
[2] M. Misztal, “Praktyczna kryptoanaliza różnicowa algorytmu DES zre-
dukowanego do 8 rund”, Bull. WAT Cryptology Part I, vol. XLVII,
no. 10(566), pp. 125–146, 1999 (in Polish).
[3] E. Biham and A. Shamir, Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis of the Data En-
cryption Standard. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[4] D. Kwiatkowski, “Implementacja i kryptoanaliza wybranych szyfrów
blokowych”, Warszawa, Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna, Wydział
Cybernetyki, 1998, Master thesis (in Polish).
[5] B. Schneier, Kryptograﬁa dla praktyków. Protokoły, algorytmy i pro-
gramy źródłowe w języku C. Warszawa: WNT, 2002 (in Polish).
Michał Misztal was born in
1973 in Kielce, Poland. He got
his M.Sc. in 1997 from Fac-
ulty of Cybernetics of Mili-
tary University of Technology
(MUT), Warsaw. He has studied
on “cryptology” specialty in the
individual course. He works as
an Assistant in the Institute of
Mathematics and Cryptology on
Faculty of Cybernetics MUT.
He conducts tutorials and lectures on mathematics and lin-
ear algebra, but also on proﬁled by the Institute “cryptol-
ogy” specialty on such subjects like cryptanalysis of block
and stream ciphers, diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis and
designing of block ciphers. He is the co-author of hand-
book entitled “Introduction to Cryptology” and the author
of several papers published among others in the bulletin
of MUT. He has also given many lectures on scientiﬁc
conferences devoted to cryptology.
e-mail: mmisztal@wat.edu.pl
Institute of Mathematics and Cryptology
Faculty of Cybernetics
Military University of Technology
S. Kaliskiego st 2
00-908 Warsaw, Poland
59
